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Abstract 
Formulations and properties of proving possession of knowledge in interactive protocols arc 
investigated. A four-move protocol for quadratic residuosity is proposed and a new notion of 
practical soundness is introduced based on its application to a cryptographic identification scheme. 
The role of cryptographic assumptions in arguments (i.e., computationally convincing proofs) of 
knowledge is also explored. 
1. Introduction 
The original notion of interactive proof systems (of membership) of languages pro- 
posed by Goldwasser et al. [30] was defined as two party protocol between a (infinitely 
powerful) prover and a (probabilistic polynomial time) verifier, in which the prover 
tries to convince the verifier that a given theorem is true. A variant notion, proofs 
of knowledge, was formulated by Feige-Fiat-Shamir [21] and Tompa-Woll [39] from 
more practical points of view, where practical provers (with only a probabilistic poly- 
nomial time computing power) can convince the verifier only when the prover knows 
a proof of the theorem. Proofs of knowledge have been regarded as an additional prop- 
erty of proofs of languages. Because any proof of knowledge is a proof of languages 
[39,38], and the known concrete zero-knowledge interactive proofs, which require no 
unproven complexity assumption, for membership of . l:‘p-languages [30,28,4] are 
shown to be zero-knowledge interactive proofs of knowledge. 
Recently, Bellare and Goldreich [3] gave rigorous definitions of proofs of knowledge 
and introduced the following weaker version of the knowledge proof Pro0j.i of’ kno\c- 
ledge should be dejined in the case oj’only the correct inputs (positive-side knowledge). 
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Their motivation was natural; previous definitions were too restrictive when they dealt 
with some subprotocols in the whole protocol, and they suggested usefulness of the new 
definition. However, they failed to show a concrete gap of the power between proofs 
of strong knowledge in the sense of [21,39] and proofs of positive-side knowledge 
in their sense. Feige et al. [21] already showed that for any language L in JPnco- 
NY, under the assumption that secure public key encryption schemes exist, the prover 
can show that he knows whether a given x is in L or in its complement 1 without 
revealing even this single bit of knowledge. This implies that, under such cryptographic 
assumptions, there are no gap between proofs of strong knowledge in the sense of 
[21,39] and proofs of positive-side knowledge in the sense of [3]. However, the idea 
in [21] is based on a general zero-knowledge interactive proofs for MY’-complete 
languages [2X], and requires a complicated transformation from the language L into 
&P-complete languages, which is not practical in our framework. 
This paper investigates more practical and concrete merits on defining proofs of 
knowledge without relying on proofs of membership of languages. First, a four-move 
protocol for quadratic residuosity is presented and its properties are explored. In the 
proposed protocol, provers cannot convince the verifier without a square root of the 
given quadratic residuosity (proofs of positive-side knowledge). However, powerful 
provers can cheat the verifier that the given integer which is not quadratic residuosity is 
quadratic residuosity (not proofs of the language). Nevertheless, we apply this protocol 
to the identification scheme such as the Fiat-Shamir setting by analyzing the cheating 
prover’s knowledge. 
A problem of zero-knolwledge protocols is inefficiency of the required communi- 
cation among the two party. The original zero-knowledge Fiat-Shamir scheme [22] 
needs polynomially many round. The direct parallelization decreases the round com- 
plexity into 3-move, however, it is no longer zero-knowledge [27]. Di Crescenzo et al. 
showed a way of obtaining a 4-move perfect ZK interactive proof system for special 
languages associated with the quadratic residuosity. However, provers in their protocol 
[16, 171 require not only the exact witness of the problem (e.g., a square root of I 
module N) but also the factorization of the modulus N as an additional knowledge 
in order to convince the verifier. So, the protocol in [ 16, 171 cannot be applied to the 
Fiat-Shamir-like ID-based identification schemes. The 5-move protocol based on the 
technique by Bellare et al. [4] has the lowest round complexity among the previous 
known perfect zero-knowledge identification schemes based on the quadratic residuos- 
ity problem. Our 4-move protocol improves the efficiency further, and is shown to be 
optimal with respect to the round complexity. 
The properties of the proposed protocol and the application introduce a new defini- 
tion on practical soundness fitted for the identification systems such as the Fiat-Shamir 
scheme. Our basic idea is to investigate the knowledge-state of the prover who con- 
vinces the wrong input (negative-side knowledge), and we regard the protocol as prac- 
tically sound if the negative-side knowledge is more powerful than the positive-side 
knowledge. (Informally speaking, if cheating is more di&ult than proving, we call 
the identification system practically sound.) We also discuss comparisons of the new 
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notion to the previous notion of security of identification, and clarify a property of 
soundness hidden in the notion of “no-transferable” introduced in [21]. 
This paper also explores arguments of knowledge, so called “computationally con- 
vincing proofs of knowledge”. Brassard et al. [lo] have investigated interactive proto- 
cols, of which soundness holds under the assumption that the prover cannot perform 
some cryptographic task. The state of knowledge of provers in arguments were dis- 
cussed in [9, 111. We further investigate the knowledge soundness of arguments, and 
consider the role of the cryptographic assumption in the case of arguments of knowl- 
edge. 
2. Notation and definitions 
Our model of computation is the interactive probabilistic Turing machines (both for 
the prover P and for the verifier V) with an auxiliary input. The common input is 
denoted by x and, and its length is denoted by 1x1 = II. We use v(n) to denote any 
function vanishing faster than the inverse of any polynomial in 11. More formally, 
Yk EN 30 s.t. vn > no 06 v(n) < i 
We define negligible probability to be the probability behaving as v(n), and orrr~~hch- 
ing probability to be the probability behaving as 1 - v(n). 
Let A(x) denote the output of a probabilistic algorithm A on input x. This is a 
random variable. When we want to make the coin tosses of A explicit, for any p E 
{O,l}” we write A[p] for the algorithm A with ,D as its random tape. Let V,(x) denote 
V’s output after interaction with P on common input x, and let M(x; A) (where A may 
be either P or V) denote the output of the algorithm A4 on input x, where M may 
use the algorithm A as a (blackbox) subroutine. Each call M makes to il is counted 
as a single computation step for M. 
Definition 2.1 (Goldwxzsser et ~1. [30]). An interactive proof for membership of the 
language L is a pair of interactive probabilistic Turing machines (P, V) satisfying: 
Lunyuaye completeness: If x belongs to L, V accepts P’s proof with overwhelming 
probability. Formally 
‘dx E L Prob( Vp(_x,(x) accepts) > 1 - I’( 1x1). 
where the probability is taken over all of the possible coin tosses of P and V. 
Lunyuuge soundness: If x does not belong to L and P* may act in any way, V 
accepts P*‘s proof with negligible probability. Formally 
Vx f$ LYP” Pvob( Vp*(x,(x) accepts) < V( jxi). 
where the probability is taken over all of the possible coin tosses of P* and V. 
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It should be noted that P (resp. P*)‘s resource is computationally unbounded, while 
V’s resource is bounded by probabilistic polynomial time in 1x1. 
We recall that the view of the verifier is everything he sees during an interaction 
with the prover, that is, his own coin tosses and the conversation between himself and 
the prover. 
Definition 2.2 (Goldwasser et al. [30]). Let (P, V) be an interactive protocol and let 
XE (0, I}*. The view of V’ on input x is the probability space 
VIEW,,V~,(X) = {(R,C):R + {o,l}p(‘X’); c t (P H V’[R])(x)}, 
where p is a polynomial bounding the running time of V’, and (P H V’[R])(x) denotes 
the probability space of conversations between P and V’[R] on input x (the probability 
is taken over the all of the possible coin tosses of P). 
Definition 2.3. An interactive proof system (P, V) for the membership of the lan- 
guage L is perfect zero knowledge if there exists a simulator S which runs in expected 
polynomial time, for every V’ and for Vx E L, S(x; V’(x)) = VZEWcp, v’,(x). 
Definition 2.4. A move of an interactive proof is a message sent by one of the partic- 
ipants. 
Definition 2.5. Let R be a relation {(x, w)} testable in 9. That is, given x and w, 
checking whether (x, w) E R is computed in polynomial time. The language associated 
with the relation R is defined to be LR = {x : 3y such that (x, y) E R}, and belongs 
to J@? Conversely, every NY’ language L naturally induces a relation RL, of which 
checking is done in polynomial time. For any x, its witness set w(x) is the set of w 
such that (x, w) E R. 
3. Previous definitions of proofs of knowledge 
Proofs (interactive) of knowledge was formulated by Feige et al. [21] and Tompa 
and Woll from a practical point of view. The original interactive proof systems [30] 
is defined to prove membership of the given inputs of the language. In GMR model, 
then, the prover’s power is assumed to be unbounded. Feige et al. [21] observed that, 
in the proposed protocol for QR [30] (GI [28]), if the polynomial time prover has 
a knowledge associated with the inputs, then he can convince the verifier that the 
input belongs to the given language. They also gave a precise definition of the state 
that the prover possesses the knowledge by introducing the extractor. 
Definition 3.1 (Fe&e et al. [21]). An interactive proof of knowledge for the relation R 
is a pair of interactive probabilistic Turing machines (P, V) satisfying: 
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Knowledge completeness: For any (x. w) E R, V accepts P’s proof with overwhelming 
probability. Formally 
V(x, w) E R Prob( Vp( ,,,j(x) accepts) > 1 - v(lxl), 
where the probability is taken over all of the possible coin tosses of P and V. 
Knowledge soundness: For any X, for any P*, P* can convince V to accept only if he 
actually “knows” a witness for x E dam R. A probabilistic polynomial time knowledge 
extractor M is used in order to demonstrate P*‘s ability to compute a witness. Formally 
Prob( VP- [i,l(I,,vt j(x) accepts) > 1 /IxI’ 
3 Prob(il/l(x; P*[p](x, w’)) E w(x)) > 1 ~ v( Ix\). 
where the probability is taken over all of the possible coin tosses of M and V. 
Note that both P’s and V’s resource are bounded by probabilistic polynomial time 
in /xl. 
Under this definition, a proof of knowledge induces a proof of the language. 
Proposition 3.2 (Tompa and Woll [39] and Sloan [38]). An interactiw proof’ of 
know~led~qe ,fiw the relation R is an interactive proqf’,fiw membership oj’ the km- 
<JUUCJP L,+ 
In fact, known concrete zero-knowledge interactive proofs, which require no un- 
proven complexity assumption, for membership of ~ KY-languages [30,28,4] are shown 
to be zero-knowledge interactive proofs of knowledge. Thus, there has been no known 
gap between proofs of languages and proofs of knowledge. 
Remark 3.3. A rigorous definition of “proofs of knowledge” by Bellare and Goldrich 
[3] deals with provers who convince the verifier with probability which is not non- 
negligible for wider applications, and we shall adopt precisely the idea in [3]. However, 
in this paper, we consider only provers whom the verifier accepts with non-negligible 
probability to clarify our introduced notion and simplify the discussion. 
4. A 4-move protocol for quadratic residuosity 
This section presents a 4-move protocol for quadratic residuosity and discusses the 
properties of the protocol. 
4.1. Quadratic residuosity 
A language quadratic residuosity (QR) is defined to be QR = {(I, N) ( Els EZ,; such 
that Z E s* (modN)}, and a language quadratic non-residuosity (QNR) is defined, as 
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the complement of QR, to be QNR = QZ?. Clearly QR is in JW (the witness is a 
square root of I module N). Also QNR is in JY’ (there is a polynomial time algorithm, 
which uses the complete factorization of N, to decide if (Z, N) E QNR). Especially, for 
a given modulus N, we denote the set of quadratic residuosity module N by QRN, i.e., 
QRN = {I ) 3s~Zi such that Z = s2 (modN)}. 
4.2. Basic idea 
The discussed protocol is originally proposed by Saito and Kurosawa [34] as a 4 
move perfect zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in the sense of [22,23,39]. However, 
their claim is not correct, because the protocol does not satisfy soundness of proofs of 
membership on QR (see Proposition 4.3). As a revision, then, Saito et al. [35] restricted 
the applied problem of the protocol into the certified discrete logarithm problem, and 
showed that the protocol is a 4-move perfect zero-knowledge proof of knowledge on 
the certified logarithm problem. 
In their protocol [35], at the first stage, the verifier constructs the basis of the bit 
commitment and sends the basis to the prover. Next the prover commits his random 
coins using the basis, and sends the verifier to these committed values. Then, after 
receiving the verifier’s challenges, the prover uses the EX-OR of the verifier’s challenge 
bits and the prover’s previous random bits as the coins which were used by the prover 
in typical 3-move interactive protocols. Note that the verifier’s challenge of the 3rd 
stage is public coins, i.e., he sends random bits directly to the prover. This part is 
different from the other constant-round ZK protocol [ 12,4]. 
This paper again considers the 4-move protocol for the quadratic residuosity problem, 
and carefully analyzes the knowledge soundness of the protocol. Each element of QR 
has multiple witnesses. Then the proposed protocol does not require a complicated 
“one out two” protocol, and is simpler than the one presented in [35]. 
Remark 4.1. The similar technique of a two-party coinflip to determine the challenge 
of the verifier is used in a paper [15], which is published after the work [34,35], 
to transform a honest verifier zero-knowledge public-coin zero-knowledge proof into 
public-coin zero-knowledge proof with respect to any verifier. 
4.3. The protocol 
The common inputs of the prover and the verifier is (Z, N), where Z = s2 (mod N) for 
some s E Z$. The prover P proves to the verifier V the fact that P knows the witness s. 
Let k = INJ. The proposed protocol consists of the following three subprotocols. 
Subprotocol A (Construction of the basis of the bit commitment) 
Al: V chooses r ER ZG and sends y = r2 (modN) to P. 
A2: V proves via a 3-move witness hiding protocol the facts that V knows a square 
root of y. 
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The following steps is executed k independent times in parullel. 
Subsubprotocol Aa 
Aal: V chooses independently u l R 2,; and sends +2: = u2 (mod N) to P. 
Aa2: P independently picks b ER (0, l}, and sends b to V. 
Aa3: V sends z = yh x u (mod N) to P, where r is generated in the previous step A 1. 
Aa4: P verifies the V’s answer by checking if z’ = _r.h x M, (mod N). 
Subprotocol B (Random bits generation by coin flipping) 
Bl: P chooses ti ER Z,; and epi CR (0, l} for i = 1,. .,k, then sends q, = 
.v”“, x tf (mod N) to V (i = 1,. . . k). 
B2: V chooses eb/, ER (0, l} (i = 1,. ..,k) and sends et,, .,el/, to P. 
B3: P sets E, = ep, @ ec; (i = 1,. . , k). Each E, is used in the next protocol as the 
V’s challenge bits. Then P sends ep, and t, for i = 1,. . , k. 
B4: V verifies the P’s answer, i.e. checks if q; = y”’ x t,’ (mod N) for i = I,. , k. 
Subprotocol C (Basic parallelized protocol for QR) 
Cl: P chooses Ri ER ZG and sends Xi = Rf (mod N) (i = I,. , k) to V. 
C2: P computes Yi = .sE, x Ri (modN) for i = 1,. . k, where E, is obtained in the 
protocol B, and sends Y, (i = 1,. . , k) to V. 
C3: V verifies if Y/ = ZEJ x X, (mod N) for i = 1,. . , k. 
We obtain the full protocol ,I by composing these sub(sub)protocols in the following 
manner: 
Full protocol A 
Vl(A1. Aal), Pl(Aa2,Bl,Cl), V2(Aa3,B2), P2(Aa4,B3,C2). V3(B4.C3), 
which is 4-move. 
4.4. Properties of the protocol 
Proposition 4.2. A (probabilistic polynomial time) prouer with a &(mod N) cm.ws 
the verijier to accept with probability one. 
Next we consider the soundness of the protocol. However, a powerful cheating prover 
P* can convince the verifier even when the input is not in QR. 
Proposition 4.3. Even ifan input I $ QR,YJ, a (poweyfil) prover P* causes the cer$ier 
to accept lt.ith probability one. 
Proof. The cheating prover P* convinces the verifier when the input I is not in QRv 
as follows. Suppose that the cheating prover P*‘s power is not restricted. Then P* 
can compute fi (mod N). As the prover P* knows fi (mod N ), the commitments q1 
is chameleon in the sense of [12] for the prover P”. That is, P* can disclose freely 
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both bit 0 and 1 as epj after he commits at the stage Bl. Then, in the subprotocol C, 
P* can choose the value Ei at the stage Cl in advance as his will. This implies the 
following prover’s cheating. 
P* ‘s cheating in subprotocol C 
Cl*: P chooses I$ ER ZG and Ei ER (0, I} (i = 1,. . ,k) and sends X, = K2/IE1 
(i = I,...,k) to V. 
C2*: P sends & (i = I,...,k) to V. 
Clearly, the verifier Y accepts the prover P* above. 0 
Corollary 4.4. The protocol A is not a proof of membership of the language QR. 
Next we investigate the knowledge of provers who accepts the verifier. 
Proposition 4.5. For any I E QRN, if P* can convince V to accept, then he actually 
“knows” a witness v’?(mod N). Or, for any I @ QRN, ifP* can convince V to accept, 
then he actually “knows” the complete factorization of the integer N. A probabilistic 
polynomial time knowledge extractor M is used in order to demonstrate P*‘s ability 
to compute a witness (or the jhctorization). 
Formally: 
Va 34 VP* VI E Zz VW’ 
Prob( V,*,,,,,,(I) accepts) > l/lJl’ 
+ Prob 
i 
M(Z; P*(Z, w’)) = 
one of& (modN) ij. I E QRN 
the complete factorization of N otherwise > 
> 1 - v(l~l), 
where the probability is taken over alI of the possible coin tosses of M and V. 
Remark 4.6. P” is assumed not to toss coins, since his favorable coin tosses can be 
incorporated into the auxiliary input w’. The knowledge extractor A4 is allowed to use 
P* as a blackbox subroutine and runs in expected polynomial time. Each message 
that P* sends M costs a single computation step for M. Throughout this paper, this 
condition is assumed when we consider the state of knowledge of provers. 
Proof. We construct a knowledge extractor M. The extractor A4 has two procedures: 
the first one is for the cheating prover in the common input x $ QRN, and the second 
one is the honest verifier in the common input x E QRN. The extractor M runs in paral- 
lel with these two procedures, because the (expected polynomial time) extractor M can- 
not decide if the input x E QRN or not by himself. Each prodecure of the extractor M 
is the following. 
Case 1: The common input x $2 QR N. First we note that in the case that the input x 
is not in QRN, if the prover P* honestly acts in the subprotocol C, then the prover P* 
K. Sakurail Theoretical Computer Scienw 181 (1997) 317-335 32s 
cannot convince the verifier. That is, an accepted prover P* must be cheating. Then, 
if the (cheating) prover P* convinces the prover in the case when x # QR,\f with 
a non-negligible probability, then the commitment qi, which is used in Subprotocol B, 
has to be a chameleon in the sense of [12]. Namely, the prover P* must reveal both 
bits 0 and 1 for the committed result qi. 
Remarking this fact, the extractor M acts as follows. In the first stage, the extractor M 
sends the prover P * random bits el;l,. , evk as the (honest) verifier V does. After 
obtaining P" ‘s answer epi, t, (i = 1, . . , k), M resets P* at the state PI. Then, the 
extractor M sends newly randomly chosen bits Cl,,, . ,t?lx, and receives P*‘s answer 
Zp;, 2, (i = 1,. . . , k). Now the extractor M has two accepting conversations. Suppose 
that et,, # PI’, f or some j. Then the P*‘s second answer Cp, is different from the 
first one ep.,, i.e., ep, # Epj. Because the obtained information satisfies the following 
condition: 
q, = f”l x t,’ = yCFi x fj2 (mod N ), 
the extractor M’s computation ti/fI (mod N) (or its inverse) produces a square root 
fi. Note that, with probability more than l/2, Y # @. In this case, M’s computation 
GCD(N, a - fi) gives a non-trivial factor of N. Thus, M iterates the above steps to 
get the complete factorization of N. The following lemma, which is formally discussed 
by Tompa and Woll [39], helps us to analyze the algorithm of the extractor M. 
Lemma 4.7 (Tompa and Woll [39]). Let N be odd und ;‘,6 be constants sutisfyiny 
0 < ;‘, 6 6 1. Suppose there is a probabilistic ahqorithm SQUREROOT(N,x) that. Jiw 
u jraction ii of the quadratic residues x in ZG, outputs u single square root of’ x 
tnodulo N tcith probability y in expected time (log N) O(‘) Then there is an alyorithm 
thut outputs the complete prime factorization of‘ N in expected time (log N )‘c’ I. 
Now y 3 i holds in the algorithm of the extractor M. However, nothing is mentioned on 
the value ii, and the problem is in the case when 6 is negligible. Then, in parallel with 
the above procedures, A4 tries to find the complete prime factorization of N by himself 
using exhaustive research. Though this procedure requires 2k times, the probability is 
negligible. Thus, this extraction terminates within expected polynomial-time. 
Case 2: The common input x E QRn. Given (a possibly cheating P*), M first 
executes the whole protocol (P*, V) by faithfully simulating V’s part. If V rejects, 
M stops and outputs nothing. Otherwise, when V accepts, next M repeatedly resets P* 
to the step V2, with choosing new random challenge bits PY I,. , Gm until P* correctly 
answers to these challenges to obtain two successful executions. In the two successful 
executions, if M finds an index j such that 
eK # 6; & epi C3 e5 # ifp, 63 go 
in B4 of V3, then M can derive a square root fi by computing x/?i (mod N) (or its 
inverse) which are P*‘s answers in step C2. Or, if M finds an index j such that 
“4 # 6; 8~ epl @ ec; = f?pi @ Zh 
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in B4 of V3, then A4 gets a square root fi by computing tilt; (mod N) (or its in- 
verse). The same argument as in the first case is applied to obtain the complete fac- 
torization of N. By using this complete factorization of N, A4 computes a square root 
&(modN). 0 
Remark 4.8. The method of the extraction of the second case is already used in [22]. 
A technique of extracting in the first case is developed in [36], in which the extrac- 
tor get the prover’s trapdoor knowledge from two different revealed information for 
a commitment. 
Thus, in the proposed protocol, the prover cannot convince the verifier without 
&(modN) or the complete factorization of N. Especially, the cheating prover who 
convinces the verifier for I $Z QRN has to know the complete factorization of N, which 
is regard as a witness of the fact that I E QNRN. 
4.5. A weuker de$nition of prooji of knowledge 
Bellare and Goldreich [3] introduce the following weak definition of proofs of 
knowledge because the previous definition is too restrictive to deal with “proofs of 
knowledge” used in the subprotocols inside the larger protocols. 
Definition 4.9. An interactive proof of positive-side knowledge for the relation R is 
a pair of interactive probabilistic Turing machines (P, V) satisfying: 
Knowledge completeness: For any (x, w) E R, V accepts P’s proof with overwhelm- 
ing probability. Formally: 
v(x,w) E R Prob( J$,,)(x)accepts) > 1 - v(lxl), 
where the probability is taken over all of the possible coin tosses of P and V. 
Positive-side knowledge validity: For any x E LR, for any P*, P* can convince V 
to accept only if he actually “knows” a witness for x E LR. A probabilistic polynomial 
time knowledge extractor A4 is used in order to demonstrate P*‘s ability to compute 
a witness. Formally: 
Va 34 VP* Yx E LR ‘dw’ vp 
Prob(VP*[pl(x,w’)(x)accepts) > lllxl” 
* Prob(M(x; P*[p](x, w’)) E w(x)) > 1 - v( ix]), 
where the probability is taken over all of the possible coin tosses of M and V. 
Note that zero-knowledgeness is discussed only for the correct input x E LR, then 
zero-knowledge proofs of positive-side knowledge is defined as in Definition 2.3. 
Proposition 4.10. For (P, V’) in the protocol A, there exists a simulator S which 
runs in expected polynomial time, for every V’ and for ‘dI E QRN, S(Z; V’(I)) = 
VJEW(P, V)(O 
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Proof. We construct a simulator S for any (possibly dishonest) verifier V’. After run- 
ning V’ as the stage Vl, the simulator first performs prover P’s part of the stage 
Pl and gets the verifier V”s messages of the stage V2. If V’ does not complete this 
stage successfully, S stops. Otherwise, S repeats the stage Pl, each time with different 
randomly chosen challenges in A2a, until V’ again successfully meets S’s challenges. 
From the two successful executions S can find a @(mod N) with overwhelming prob- 
ability. Once S obtain such an information, S can disclose freely both bit 0 and 1 as 
ep, after he committed ep, at B 1. This allows S to carry out P’s part P2 without know- 
ing a J?(modN). Note that this simulation fails into an infinite execution in which 
there is only one set of S’s challenges that V answers correctly. To guard against this 
infinite execution, the simulator S, in parallel with the original steps, tries to find the 
desired object fi(mod N) using exhaustive search. Though this computation requires 
exponential time, this case happens with negligible probability. Then the latter case 
requires only expected polynomial time for the simulation, and totally the simulator 
can produce a view of the protocol perfectly indistinguishable from the view of V’ in 
in r.upectrd polynomial time. 0 
Theorem 4.11. Protocol A is u perfect zero-knobvledge proof qfpositivr-side knorz,l- 
edge on RQR. 
The known previous protocols with positive-side knowledge are proofs of member- 
ship of languages. Our proposed protocol is the first example of proofs of positive-side 
knowledge but not of membership of languages. 
Theorem 4.12. There exists a protocol which is a proof of positive-side kno,t~led~qr 
on u relation R but not of proofs of membership of the languaye LR. 
4.5.1. Round optimality 
We show that the protocol LI is optimal with respect to the round complexity. 
The lower bound of the round which zero-knowledge protocols needs is shown by 
Goldreich and Krawczyk [27]. That is, Goldreich and Krawczyk [27] showed that the 
zero-knowledge interactive proof for a language needs at least 4-move unless the lan- 
guage is in .%9Y. Although our protocol is not proof of language, a further analysis 
of the argument of the proof in [27] implies the following. 
Theorem 4.13. If a .,YY-relation R has a 3-moue zero-knowledge proof of positiue- 
side knowledge, then there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, 
with overwhelming probability. 
The proof of this theorem is a similar argument as one in [31] 
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Corollary 4.14. If an &V-relation R has 3-move zero-knowledge protocol which sat- 
isfies positive-side knowledge soundness, then the language LR is in &WY’. 
Corollary 4.15. Protocol A is optimal with respect to the round complexity among 
perfect zero-knowledge proofs of positive-side knowledge on RQR unless QR E 9&V’. 
5. An application of proposed protocol 
This section applies our proposed scheme into an identification scheme fitted to 
identity (ID)-based systems. 
5.1. Fiat-Shamir identijication scheme 
Fiat and Shamir [24] apply the zero-knowledge protocol for QR [30] into an ID- 
based identification scheme. The scheme assumes the existence of a trusted center 
which issues users’ private/public key as follows: 
The unique trusted center’s secret key in the system is (p,q), and the public 
key is N, where plq are distinct large primes, N = p x q. The center generates 
user A’s secret key SA, where 11s~ = fi(modN). IA is the identity of user A 
and is published to other users. 
At the identification stage between user A and user B, user A sends his identity 1~ 
to the user B, and A shows B that A knows &(mod N) by GMR-zero-knowledge 
interactive proof for QR. 
5.2. Complexity assumptions in cryptographic setting 
Fiat-Shamir identification scheme [24] is based on the difficulty of computing mod- 
ular square roots when the factorization of N is unknown, If the factoring assumption 
does not hold, the identification system is no longer secure because everybody can 
convince users. Thus, such an intractability assumption is indispensable to construct 
identification schemes such as that in [24]. This is in contrast to the theoretical result 
that QR has a perfect zero-knowledge interactive proof of the language, which holds 
even if QR belongs to g9V’. 
5.3. Optimal round zero-knowledge identijication scheme 
Designing optimal-round zero-knowledge interactive proofs without any unproven 
assumption is an interesting problem from a theoretical point of view. On the other 
hand, constructing optimal-round secure identification scheme with possibly weak as- 
sumptions is an important topic from practical points of view. 
We should note that if QR has a 4-move perfect ZIUP with no assumption still 
remains open. The previous known protocols require 5-move interaction [4] or an 
additional unproven assumption [22]. Nevertheless, our proposed protocol supplies an 
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optimal-round zero-knowledge identification scheme based on QR. In our protocol, 
if we assume the hardness of the factoring, no (polynomial time powerful) prover 
convinces the verifier for the inputs x $ QRhf, except the trusted center which generates 
the modulus N. The soundness of our protocol is the same as that of the original Fiat- 
Shamir scheme [24] in such a practical setting. 
Thus, this paper gives a positive answer to the open question of constructing an 
optimal-round zero-knowledge identification scheme based on QR. 
Remark 5.1. Feige-Fiat-Shamir [21] characterized the security of the 3-move paral- 
lelization of Fiat-Shamir scheme [24]; however, it is no longer zero-knowledge [27] 
and there exists essential gap between the zero-knowledge and the security of the direct 
parallel version [37]. 
6. Proposed new formulation of practical soundness 
What is soundness? Soundness is the condition on the object which the verifier 
accepts. In the proofs of language, soundness implies that the verifier accepts only the 
inputs that belong to the language. In the proofs of knowledge, soundness implies that 
the verifier accepts only the provers who know the correct knowledge associated with 
the input. 
6.1. Ident$ication scheme 
We first give a definition of the identification scheme of Fiat-Shamir-like setting. As 
observed in Section 5.2, an identification is constructed based on certain 1 B-relation 
R, of which hard instances are generated in probabilistic polynomial time [l]. 
Definition 6.1. An identification scheme based on a 1 Y-relation R consists of two 
stages: 
1. lnitialization between a center and each user: The unique trusted center gener- 
ates system parameters commonly used among all users as a part of the public key. 
Furthermore, the center generates user A’s secret key SKA and public key PK.4 which 
satisfy the relation R(SKA,PK~), and PKA is published to other users. 
2. Operation between any user A and a verifier B: User A demonstrates her identity 
to the verifier B by proving the fact that “she knows the secret key SK, for the public 
key PK,d” via some protocol. At the end of the protocol, B decides if B accepts A 
or not. 
6.2. A new soundness 
We define a new soundness fitted to Fiat-Shamir Identification-setting by extending 
the observation on the proposed protocol. Our basic idea is that we accept the cheating 
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prover for x 6 LR if such a cheating requires much power than (the honest prover’s) 
proving possession of a witness w for any input x E LR. 
In general identification schemes, the trusted center gives a certificate (e.g., via digital 
signatures) on each user’s public key to avoid the user from using x $Z LR. However, 
the ID-based Fiat-Shamir scheme does not have always this mechanism. We have to 
consider the system, in which only the common public modulus N is certificated but 
a user A’s public information b has no certificate. In such a case, a cheating prover 
would have a chance to use I” 6 QRN as his public information. Thus, it is very 
important to discuss cheating provers who use x 6 LR. 
Definition 6.2. An identification scheme based on a relation R is called practically 
sound if it satisfies the condition that (1) for any x E LR, if P* can convince I’ to 
accept, then he actually “knows” a witness of w(x), or (2) for any x @ LR, if P* 
can convince V to accept, then he actually “knows” a witness of w(x) for any x E LR. 
A probabilistic polynomial time knowledge extractor M is used in order to demonstrate 
P*‘s ability to compute such these witnesses. 
Formally: 
Qa 34 VP* Qx E (0, 1)" VW’ 
Pro& Vp*(x,,lj(x)accepts) > l/(xJa 
+ Prob M(x; P*(x, w’)) 
a witness of w(x) if xELR 
= K s.t. 30 prob. poly-time algorithm > 1 - v(lxl). 
satisfying Qy E LR D(y; K) E w(y) otherwise 
Thus, the identification scheme based on the relation R~R of which operating stage 
is the proposed 4-move protocol is practically sound. 
Remark 6.3. For a given composite number N and integer g (0 <g <IV), consider the 
following relation R~N,~): 
~AW(X~ Y) * Y = s” CmodN). 
Our 4-move protocol is also described based on this relation R(N,~). We discuss the 
identification scheme based on the relation R~N,~) of which operating stage is the 
4-move protocol. The following property is obtained by an argument similar to that in 
Proposition 4.5. 
Qa 34 QP” Qy E Z,$ VW’ 
Prob(Vps(y,wf)(y)accepts) > l/lyl” 
w’)) = 
of w(v) 
> complete factorization of N 
’ 1 - 4l.YI). 
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It should be noted that there are no known probabilistic polynomial time algorithm to 
compute discrete logarithms over the modulus of the composite integer N even using 
the complete factorization of N. Then, in the case above, we cunnot conclude that the 
identification is practically sound in our sense. 
6.3. Comparison to the previous soundness 
Though there are some works to propose weaker notion than zero-knowledge [2 1,231, 
some attention has been paid to weaken the soundness of cryptographic protocols. 
Recall a notion of the security of the practical identification scheme proposed by 
P11. 
As mentioned in Section 5.2, practical identification schemes need some intractability 
problem. We denote the cryptographic assumption used in the identification scheme by 
%,r/. Namely, practical user (in general, probabilistic poly-time power) cannot break 
the assumption %d. The previous definitions [21,32] do not include the cryptographic 
assumptions; however, the following definition is given based on the cryptographic 
assumption ‘6.d. 
Definition 6.4. A prover A (resp. verifier B) who honestly acts is denoted by 1 (resp. 
B). Let k be a dishonest prover who does not complete the initialization stage of 
Definition 6.1 and may deviate from the protocols. b is not a dishonest verifier. 
An identification scheme (A,B) is no-transferable if 
-- 
I. ( A, B) succeeds with overwhelming probability. 
2. If there exists a coalition of k,B with the property that, after a polynomial 
number of executions of ( A,fi) and relaying a transcript of the communication to 
2, it is possible to execute (k,B) with nonnegligible probability of success, then 
there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm M which breaks the assumption 
%.d. 
Proposition 6.5. Suppose that the operating protocol (A,B) of an identification scheme 
based on R satisfies three conditions that (1) knowledge completeness, (2) practical 
soundness, and (3) zero-knowledgeness, then (A,B) is no-transferable under the as- 
sumption that the relation R is hard, i.e. there are no probabilistic polynomial time 
algorithm that compute a witness W(X) for an instance X. 
Feige et al. [21] introduced the notion of no-transferable to characterize the security of 
the 3-move direct parallelization of FS-scheme. A weaker notion than zero-knowledge 
is proposed as witness hiding [23], and a connection to the notion of no-transferable is 
explored [14]. Among these works on how to weaken the security of zero-knowledge, 
our formulation on practical soundness is the first attempt to weaken the soundness of 
cryptographic protocol. In fact, our protocol gives an evidence that the notion of no- 
transferable weakens not only the security (e.g., zero-knowledge) but also the soundness 
(e.g., language soundness). 
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7. On soundness of interactive arguments 
Brassard et al. [lo] have investigated interactive protocols, of which soundness re- 
quires the condition that the prover cannot break some cryptographic assumptions. 
The state of knowledge of provers in arguments were discussed in [9, Ill. We further 
investigate the knowledge soundness of arguments. 
Let Y(x) be the task that the (probabilistic polynomial time) prover cannot perform 
while the protocol is in progress when an instance x is given. Previous argument 
protocols [ 10, 12,9] for a language L have the following property. 
Proposition 7.1. For x E (0, 1 }*, suppose that P* can convince V to accept. 
1. Zf x # L, then P* can compute T(x). 
2. Z~XEL, then 
(a) P” cun compute T(x), or 
(b) P* actually “knows” u witness of w(x). 
Thus, there needs a cryptographic assumption that prover cannot do the task Y(x) in 
arguments for membership of the language. The following result shown by Fortnow 
[25] implies that such a cryptographic assumption is indispensable to arguments for 
NP-complete languages. 
Theorem 7.2 (Fortnow [25]). Zf a language L has a perfect zero-knowledge interac- 
tive proof of lunguuges, then the language L is in CO-S&~?. 
Remark 7.3. Though the flaw of the original proof in [25] is remarked by [29], the 
result can be proved by using the argument of [2]. 
Note that if Co-&A contains an .A’Y-complete problem, then that the polynomial- 
time hierarchy collapses to the second level [7]. 
Next, we focus on the situation that the input is correct x EL. In this case, provers 
need a knowledge w(x) or computation power to execute Y(x) to convince the verifier. 
Under the assumption that the prover cannot do the task T(x), the prover cannot 
convince the verifier without the knowledge w(x). This is the observation on arguments 
of knowledge [9]. Thus, the previous scheme needs the cryptographic assumption that 
prover cannot do the task r(x) to be shown as arguments of knowledge. However, 
there still be a possibility of the existence of perfect zero-knowledge argument for 
A’??-complete problem with the following property. 
For x E (0, l}*, suppose that P* can convince V to accept. 
1. If x 6 LR, then P* can compute Y(x). 
2. If x E LR, then P* actually “knows” a witness of w(x). 
It should be noted that in such a scheme, the cryptographic assumption is work- 
ing only for the soundness of language, and the knowledge-validity relies upon no 
assumption. 
However, the author have the negative conjecture. 
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Conjecture. If a relation R has a perfect zero-knowledge proof of positive-knowledge, 
then the associated language LR is in Co-.&J~. 
The conjecture above is a knowledge-version of the Fortnow’s theorem. However, 
the proof of Fortnow’s result is essentially dependent on the fact that the protocol 
satisfies the language soundness with no assumption. 
8. Concluding remarks 
This paper investigated definitions and properties of convincing possession of the 
proof of a given theorem in interactive protocols, and proposed 4-move perfect zero- 
knowledge ID-based identification scheme in the Fiat-Shamir setting. However, the 
discussed 4-move protocol is not a proof of membership of the language of quadratic 
residuosity. Thus, we still have the following question. 
Open Problem: Does there exist a 4-move interactive proof system for the general 
quadratic residuosity problem without any unproven assumption? 
The applicability of our introduced notion to non-interactive settings also remains. 
Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NZKP) were investigated in [ 18,6,5], and 
their knowledge validity are discussed in [20, 191. Among these works, De Santis and 
Persiano [ 191 presented formal definitions for NZKP of knowledge. In their defini- 
tion, as the interactive cases, knowledge soundness is still defined as an additional 
property over NZKP of membership of the language. Note that, as considered in this 
paper, NZKP of positive-side knowledge can be defined without relying on language 
soundness. 
However, there are no known concrete scheme which is NZKP of positive-side 
knowledge R but not of language LR, and the merit of giving a weaker notion is still 
unclear. Constructing NZKP of positive-side knowledge R which is not of language 
LR, and finding practical merits are interesting research topics. 
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